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Fabulous Law: Legal Fables
If fables are characterized as talking animals dispensing moral wisdom through
allegory,¹ then the moral wisdom dispensed through the legal fable is inevitably
understood to comprehend allegories relating to power, sovereignty and in/jus-
tice, as exemplified by La Fontaine’s seventeenth-century fable “The Wolf and
the Lamb,”² and its contemporary amplification by Derrida in The Beast and
the Sovereign.³ These exemplars animate law in the abstract, and through the
form of the animated figures acting as proxies for law,⁴ seem to bar the possibil-
ity that the fabular might also extend to the realities of law and its actors. This
legal fable of power, sovereignty and in/justice reiterates through the force of its
narrators; how Derrida construes La Fontaine, or at least how Derrida is under-
stood to construe La Fontaine, forecloses other ways in which fables of the law
might be seen to manifest themselves. In common law jurisdictions (England,
Canada, the US, Australia and New Zealand), the realities of law and its manifes-
tations function in the material and everyday, nesting within the decisions of the
courts. These decisions and their associated reasoning becomes law, but the legal
fable of la Fontaine or Derrida seems to say little about this kind of law.
Yet as this chapter reveals, we do a disservice to the abstract legal fable of
story and moral of the kind retold through Derrida, if we imagine it as something
apart from its own material conditions. Later in this collection, I turn to a deci-
sion of the highest court in the Australian legal hierarchy from the turn of the
twentieth century, which continues to exert its force more than a century later,
to illustrate just how law fables. This is an exemplary case;⁵ its own fabulous en-
 Georges Van Den Abbeele, “Fable,” Historical Materialism . (): –.
 Jean de la Fontaine (–), available at : http://www.la-fontaine-ch-thierry.net/ (last
access June , ).
 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume I, ed. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet
and Ginette Michaud, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago P, ). See
also Jacques de Ville, “Deconstructing the Leviathan: Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign,”
Societies  (): –; Matthew Chrulew and Chris Danta, “Introduction – Fabled
Thought: On Jacques Derrida’s The Beast & the Sovereign,” SubStance . (): –. The
fable itself originates much earlier through Aesop and other variations exist.
 Chrulew and Danta, “Introduction,” , raise the paradox of Derrida’s real encounter with his
pet cat, as opposed to the figure of cats in their fabular and allegorical form.
 Exemplarity and Singularity: Thinking Through Particulars in Philosophy, Literature and Law,
eds. Michèle Lowrie and Susanne Lüdemann (Oxford: Routledge, ), contains a range of es-
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gagement with the fabular, along with its contemporary fabulization, means that
it is fabled in and by law. Though it speaks to the fable in its allegorical sense,
complete with talking animals – and a fabulous creature – this is a fabulous case
for other reasons entirely. It speaks to the common law’s practice of extracting
law and legal principles from a vibrant and lived experience that is rendered a
carapace, based on the premise that the principles contained in cases speak
for themselves time out of mind. Decided in 1908, it is still good law in 2015 (hav-
ing not been overturned by legislation or later judicial decisions), and it is read
as if it were part of the here and now. Despite this, the case now stands only for
principles supported by a bare and scant background known as the “facts” (the
material circumstances which animate legal principles and thus the law), which
are more or less unmoored in time and space, but which are taken to be inter-
pretatively complete because they rely upon the rhetoric of reason and rational-
ity – unpolluted by the seeming irrelevance of the narrative that nests within the
text of the case. However, the “facts” are a necessary component and supple-
ment to the common law’s interpretative requirements, yet this does not stop
the law being fabled. For the continued presence of this exemplary case “raises
and complicates questions of exemplarity, rhetoric, and power […] exemplify
[ing], as Louis Marin argues, the way in which narratives lay traps for readers.
The simplicity of the fable masks and reveals the complex rhetorical operations
of ‘fabula.’”⁶
This play of fabula is the jester’s trick. You might have noticed a surplus of
fables so far in this introduction, denoted through the stylistic and typographical
convention of the italic, a practice marking words as foreign.⁷ Yet none of these
fables are foreign, though all are fabulous. Even seemingly invented words are
real. The derivation of the word is the key, because fables are nothing other
than stories. And stories, for a rational world at least, are inherently untrustwor-
thy, defined variously as a “fictitious narrative or statement; a story not founded
on fact,”⁸ which “speak falsely, talk falsehoods, lie,” that “fabricate, invent (an
says reconsidering the role of the Roman exemplar and role of exemplarity in and around law
against the post-Enlightenment negation of the exemplar in favour of the abstract.
 Marc Redfield, “Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics
(review),” Modern Language Quarterly .  (): –, .
 The italic formed the typographical enigma used in The Da Vinci Code case, Baignent & Leigh
v The Random House Group Ltd [] EWHC . As Peter Goodrich notes, the device was sim-
ply unobserved by those reading the case: Peter Goodrich, Legal Emblems and the Art of Law:
Obiter Depicta as the Vision of Governance (New York: Cambridge University P, ), –.
 “Fable, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, October . Web. (last access October ,
).
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incident, a personage, story, etc.).”⁹ Fabulousness is defined to mean a “prone-
ness to fiction or invention,” and thus includes a “foolish or ridiculous story;
idle talk, nonsense.”¹⁰ This word is unforgiving: “to take (something) for fable
or to hold at fable,”¹¹ (from the Old French tenir a fable),¹² is to be gulled, or
to be fooled. There is nothing fabulous about this state of affairs at all, for to
be fabulous in this sense is “of a doctrine, error, or notion: Based on or originat-
ing in fable or fiction.”¹³ We, too, are fabled, but not in a good sense.We are dis-
combobulated, gulled, made foolish, exposed as making things up, to be taken
for fable. To think of the fable as a negative is the very form of fable itself,
through its etymology and morphology. We fable when we make things up, in-
vent, when we are fooled and when we are foolish.
There are more, many more varieties of fable, but that is as good a place to
stop as any, because we get the picture.We might not have meant to, but we have
fabled the text if we interpolated the allegorical fable in the place of that other
fable, the fable that is fiction and lie. Lawyers fable the law of the past through
the common law’s privileging of abstraction as the basis of rational law, in the
practices that assume that the imposition of rules and formal legal interpretative
devices, such as the rules of statutory interpretation or stare decisis, act as bul-
warks against the possibility of unreason or judicial inventiveness, or the possi-
bility of fabling.¹⁴ For these reasons, among many, law pays nearly no attention
to its own historicization, its materialities, preferring to believe that the reduc-
tion of the narratives and circumstances into bare rules and principles achieves
a formal legality. Law pays little or no attention to the possibility that those rules
and principles might be affected by the loss of knowledge of narratives and cir-
cumstances, and paradoxically results in the formation of fabulous law. Nor do
legal actors always realize that they, too, are historicized, and that they too will
 “Fable, v.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, October . Web. (last access October ,
).
 “Fabulousness, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, October .Web. (last access Oc-
tober , ).
 “† Fabulousness, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, October . Web. (last access
October , ).
 “† Fabulousness, n.” OED Online.
 “Fabulous, adj.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, October . Web. (last access Octo-
ber , ).
 This needs to be distinguished (a favourite technique of the common law) from the inventive
device known as the legal fiction used to achieve a particular legal result in a case. Legal fictions
are not legal novels or law as fiction. For accounts of the theory and practice of the legal fiction,
see the essays contained in Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice, eds. Maksymilian Del Mar and
William Twining (Switzerland: Springer, ), generally.
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inevitably fable law and the reading of cases by imposing the lens of the present
onto the law of the past. The fabulous case to be considered later in this collec-
tion makes just this point.
1. Faire Savoir
The possibility that lawyers might fable because they are bound up in and
through the world they inhabit (or that we might need to engage with worlds
that have been lost), that is from outside and beyond the limits of law is both
unthinkable and fabulous, as the Oxford English Dictionary’s etymological exam-
ples of the word fabulous reveals. The Dictionary uses examples from two heroes
of the common law, Hobbes (1588–1679) and Paine (1737– 1809), to illustrate
how that which is fabulous – superstition and irrationality – I is seemingly rem-
edied by the forces of reason and rationality (and establishing fundamental,
foundational stories of law along the way). So the Dictionary draws on Hobbes’
Leviathan, published in 1651 in these terms: “T. Hobbes Leviathan iv. xliv. 334
Their fabulous Doctrine concerning Dæmons.”¹⁵ And nearly 150 years later, in
1794, the Dictionary illustrates the negative connotation through the title of
Paine’s: “The Age of Reason, being an investigation of true and of fabulous
Theology.”¹⁶ Fabulous, yes, but these fabulous definitions could not be further
from our present day conception of the word. For despite the traps and warnings
already activated, if we hold onto the carapace of a word, we fable (in its nega-
tive sense) if we read these delightful sentences to invoke the fabulous of every-
day parlance, to mean wonderful or marvellous or special, à la Ab-Fab, itself Ab-
solutely Fabulous.¹⁷ These are not wonderful doctrines, or marvellous theologies,
but fictitious, foolish, invented, anti-empiricist and anti-rational doctrines and the-
ologies. Law’s faith in the anti-fabulous is, however, misplaced, because that
which is seemingly rational and reasonable, removed of Dæmons and Theolo-
gies, is as capable of being as negatively fabulous as that which it overcame.
QED; if lawyers do not look beyond what is assumed in the text of long-standing
principles found in case law, then we fable the law in unexpected ways. Ration-
ality and reason is no bulwark against fabulous readings of the texts of law
through the unintentional agencies of law’s actors.
 The Leviathan is central to Derrida’s argument: Derrida, Beast and Sovereign; de Ville, “De-
constructing the Leviathan”
 “Fabulous, adj.”OED Online.
 Absolutely Fabulous, available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absolutely_Fabulous (last
access February , ).
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Derrida, too, understood the wont of fabulous fable, recognising and under-
standing that fables have multiple, perverse meanings, through the inversion in-
volved in the construction of knowledge, and how it might be subverted or con-
torted through the process by which meaning is created. Derrida understood that
fables make meaning through their faire savoir,¹⁸ that is that they make, mean-
ing, or as translated literally, “make to know.”¹⁹ Derrida’s conception of the faire
savoir is not unidimensional however, and needs to be understood in two differ-
ent registers. The first of these is anodyne, the faire savoir as the didactic fable of
the kind that reveals itself as the expected notion of fable as story, moral,
parable.²⁰ The second form through which Derrida conceives of fable is through
both a literal and a figurative shift of emphasis as the “faire” savoir, which is of a
different order of fable entirely, involved in:
“making like” knowledge [“faire” savoir], i.e. giving the impression of knowing, giving
the effect of knowledge, resembling knowing where there isn’t necessarily any knowing:
in the latter case of faire savoir, giving the effect of knowing, the knowing is a pretend know-
ing, a false knowing, a simulacrum of knowing, a mask of knowing.²¹ [my emphasis in
bold]
This “making like” knowledge is the domain of the negative fable. While Derri-
da’s concerns about “faire” savoir sits within the domains of power, “faire” savoir
is precisely the form in which law speaks when its actors fable, making like
knowledge, as legal fabulars, “a narrator or recorder of tales or fictions,”²² or fa-
blers, “one who speaks falsely, a liar (obs.),”²³ who fabulates and fabulizes by
“inventing, concocting and fabricating.”²⁴ Of course, not all or even most, law
is fabled, but that law can be fabled by legal fab(u)la/e/rs reveals that law is em-
bodied, temporally and spatially grounded and actor dependent, for as Derrida
observes, fables are nothing on their own:
 Drawing on Marin’s earlier exploration of the role of law and power through the fable: Louis
Marin, Food for Thought, trans. Mette Hjort (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, ), xviii.
 Derrida, Beast and Sovereign, .
 Derrida, Beast and Sovereign, .
 Derrida, Beast and Sovereign, .
 “† Fabular, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, October .Web. (last access October
, ).
 “† c. Fabler, n.” OED Online. (last access October , ).
 “Fabulate, v.” . “To invent, concoct, fabricate;” “† Fabulize, v.” “To concoct, invent;” OED
Online. Oxford University Press, October . Web. (last access October , ).
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What is fabulous in the fable does not only depend on its linguistic nature, on the fact that
the fable is made up of words. The fabulous also engages act, gesture, action […] in organ-
izing, disposing discourse in such a way as to recount, to put living beings on stage, to ac-
credit the interpretation of a narrative, to faire savoir, to make knowledge, to make perform-
atively, to operate knowledge.²⁵
Words do not act on their own, nor does law. Law’s actors inevitably are involved
in “making to know,” but law’s practice is such that it denies the possibility
that law, with its techniques grounded in the assumptions that rationality and
reason immunize law’s actors from fabling, might result in “making like knowl-
edge.” Yet it is not hard to find the negative legal fable, the “faire” savoir, in ac-
tion, if you know where to look, as the exemplary fabled case that I turn to later
in the collection reveals how the legal actor “makes [law] like knowledge.” To
take us there, and to understand how abstract law needs material narrative,
we need to step, briefly, back into the domain of that other type of fable, and
what it reveals of the trap into which law’s actors might fall, because of and
not despite, the promise of reason and rationality.
2. The reason of the strongest is always best /
La raison du plus fort est toujours la
meilleure
To be fabulose is to be “fond of fables, myths, or enigmas.”²⁶ If the traps placed
for readers in this chapter so far have not done their job, there are more to follow,
including what seems to be a volte-face, a turn to precisely the form of fable that
appeared to have been eschewed, the legal fable of the type identified at the be-
ginning of this chapter. The reason can only be revealed later, inevitably, through
the kind of trap Marin identifies as the wont of the fable through the play of fab-
ula.
 Derrida, Beast and Sovereign, –.
 “† fabulose, adj.”OED Online. Oxford University Press, October .Web.  October .
(last access October , ). Enigma is defined as: a. A short composition in prose or verse,
in which something is described by intentionally obscure metaphors, in order to afford an exer-
cise for the ingenuity of the reader or hearer in guessing what is meant; a riddle; †b. In wider
sense: An obscure or allusive speech; a parable; . fig. Something as puzzling as an enigma;
an unsolved problem is unlikely to be the form in which enigma is deployed in the definition
of fabulose: “enigma, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, June . Web. (last access
March , ).
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The title of this sub-heading contains the first words and the moral of La
Fontaine’s fable, ²⁷ “The Wolf and the Lamb,”²⁸ first published in 1668. This is
the same fable referred to at the start of this chapter and though La Fontaine’s
is one of the best known versions, the fable has circulated since “Aesop.”²⁹
Even if we know nothing of it, there is something about the title of the fable
that gives us clues, the proximity of the words wolf and lamb speaking to an in-
evitability that is unlikely to refer to the promise that “The wolf also shall dwell
with the lamb.”³⁰ We are expected to know that something awful is most likely
going to happen in the lines of this fable, but La Fontaine’s opening words – the
reason of the strongest is always best – appear at odds with a fable about animals
whose likely end will result because of their relative inequities of power and
strength. Wolves eat lambs, so the call to reason, and the coupling of reason
with strength seems odd, but the words recall and echo those of a Latin version
of the fable by the Anglo-Norman poet Walter, titled “De Lupo et Agno,”³¹ whose
“resigned moral [… says] ‘Thus the harmful one hurts the harmless, and invents
a reason for harming.’”³² For as Shaw puts it: “In the final lines, the creatures’
conflict is resolved as predictably and as unfairly as the opening moral leads
us to expect.”³³
The opening words of La Fontaine’s version of the fable have been called
“bitterly ironic and stated a priori,”³⁴ as a denial of justice through power and
force.³⁵ But Marin, using the “elaborately tuned instrument of both practical
and theoretical reason” (invoked by the use of the word “reason” in the fable),
reads these opening words as something else again, that its grammar and logic
inevitably means that the reader has to accept their truth, that the reason of
 Marin, Food for Thought, ; as noted earlier, Derrida refers to Marin’s chapter in his semi-
nar: Derrida, Beast and Sovereign, –. For a further on the ethico-political purpose of the fable:
Thomas Keenan Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics
(Stanford: The Stanford University P, ), –, –.
 Derrida, Beast and Sovereign, 
 c.–c. B.C.E; the fables entered into Europe through the prose versions of Phaedrus
(first century C.E.), the Latin versifier of Aesop’s fables which bears the name of Romulus.
 Isaiah :King James Authorised Version
 The Anglo-Norman Walter of England, c..
 “Walter of England, ‘De Lupo et Agno,’” in The Fables of ‘Walter of England’, ed. Aaron E.
Wright (Toronto, ): –,  cited in Laura Wang, “Robert Henryson and the Animal
in the Mirror,” Review of English Studies  (): –, .
 Mary Lewis Shaw, The Cambridge Introduction to French Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, ), .
 Shaw, French Poetry, .
 Shaw, French Poetry, .
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the strongest is best,³⁶ that the wolf exercises power precisely because it is the
strongest,³⁷ and that strength comes about through law:
Violence will always lie at the origin of law; power will always be the basis of morality; and
law and morality will never be anything but justifications of power. Unable to make justice
strong, mankind ensured that power was made just […] The discourses of the wolf and the
lamb proves the truth of [the opening] words, while the story simply shows the saying’s
veracity.³⁸
Marin’s extension of the moral into this considerably widened reach can only be
found by reading the fable through the insights of the contemporaneous text, ³⁹
the 1662 Logic of Port-Royal.⁴⁰ Marin’s reading is grounded both within the prob-
lems that the Logic sought to understand along with the critical dimension con-
tained within the devices La Fontaine’s deploys in the fable itself. The [originally
anonymous] priestly authors of the Logic brought “the Augustinian tradition to
its culmination within the Cartesian épistémè,”⁴¹ bringing speculative knowledge
into ‘a doctrine of morals teaching the proper conduct of life and actions’.”⁴² The
melding of two distinct discourses to form “a grammar and a logical system that
is simultaneously an ethics and, vice versa, an ethics that is simultaneously a
logical system and a grammar,”⁴³ the Logic brought “scientific knowledge and
the moral knowledge within the same rational economy and method.”⁴⁴ The
logic of the Logic necessarily “involved the possibility of articulating a proposi-
tional logic of judgment together with a discursive ethics that would aim to reg-
ulate ‘those erroneous readings that occur in civil life and ordinary speech’.”⁴⁵
Marin’s starting point is that the fable problematizes questions of ethical
virtue and moral obligation, including the obligation that the reader faces. He
argues that by leaving readings open that include the possibility that power
 Marin, Food for Thought, –.
 Marin, Food for Thought, –, .
 Marin, Food for Thought, .
 Marin, Food for Thought, .
 Published in editions between –: Marin, Food for Thought, i; originally anony-
mously. The authors were later revealed as the theologian-philosophers Antoine Arnauld
(–) and Pierre Nicole (–).
 Marin, Food for Thought, i.
 Marin, Food for Thought, .
 Marin, Food for Thought, .
 Claude Imbert, “Port-Royal et la géométrie des modalitiés subjectives,” Le Temps de la Re-
fléxion Gallimard n°  , , n , cited in Marin as “Port-Royal and the Geometry of Sub-
jective Modalities,” Food for Thought, .
 Marin, Food for Thought, –.
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can be moralized as a discourse of justice, or justice factualized as power, there
is an inevitable pull on the part of the reader, who is caught by its opening call to
reason, amplified by its insistence that it is the reason of the strongest that is
“best”:⁴⁶
Its theme is the conflict between fact and value, between an objectively established given
and an ethical and ideal teleology. This is a conflict encountered by a moral subject, acting
within the sphere of practical reason. It is a conflict that has to be worked out and resolved
within the conduct of life.⁴⁷
Through his intricate semiotic decoding of the fable, using the means and prac-
tices of the Logic and its associated grammar, ⁴⁸ we understand that the talking
animals, wolf and lamb, are cyphers: the wolf represents the state of nature, the
little lamb civil society, culture, and law (as well as the inevitable representation
of innocence and theological references that abound in the image of the lamb),
that they are more than creatures of unequal strength and power.⁴⁹ The state of
nature in the fable is a place of universal warfare “governed by brute facts and
sheer power relations […] a state of nature unrestricted by sanctions or obliga-
tions, a realm governed by the physical necessities of sheer power relations.”⁵⁰
It is inevitable that the little lamb, accidently encountering the wolf, constructs
cogent, reasoned arguments that she has done no wrong against him by drinking
from a stream, but he asserts sovereignty and power over her nonetheless. Rea-
son might be the best gesture through which to understand how to act, but it
fails the lamb. The wolf makes a claim in property, and establishes a series of
wrongs for which the lamb must take the blame,⁵¹ despite being a new-born.
The wolf dispatches her regardless: Sans une autre forme de procès (without
 Marin, Food for Thought, .
 Marin, Food for Thought, .
 Marin, Food for Thought, –.
 Marin, Food for Thought, –.
 Marin, Food for Thought, . There is something of Hobbes’ state of nature here, but Marin
reads the relationships theologically, that the wolf is authorized to act through a transcendent
power, expiating its guilt in exercising power over the lamb: Marin, Food for Thought, .
Hobbes and La Fontaine’s lives overlapped. Marc Fumaroli Le poète et le roi: Jean de La Fontaine
et son siècle (Paris: Editions de Fallois, ),  observes that French writers of the seventeenth
century were opposed to the political thought of Hobbes, Machiavelli and modern politics: cited
in Katherine Ibbett, The Style of the State in French Theater, –: Neoclassicism and Gov-
ernment (Surrey & Burlington: Ashgate, ), .
 Marin, Food for Thought, .
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any (other) form of trial);⁵² “cette expression remonte au XVIe siècle, où les con-
damnations à mort étaient légion, et qu’elles avaient lieu après une parodie de
procès.”⁵³
This reference to a show trial is a clue which reveals that something more is
going on in this fable than can be explained through reason and logic, or the pull
solely of a traducing of rationality and reason. Though not perhaps directly ref-
erencing the formal, political show trials of sixteenth-century France, we are left
in no doubt that law has failed the lamb, and that it is the wolf’s claim to power
through property that is the reason for this travesty of justice. What is not obvi-
ous, for those of us from another time and place, and for whom the image of the
political show trial of the ancien régime and the themes of sovereignty, power
and in/justice inherited through Derrida (and Marin), we find ourselves reading
the fable through that filter, to the exclusion of a lost, though much richer, site of
attack – that of everyday material law, the actions of property owners, and the
role of lawyers.
For La Fontaine has larded the fable with local, everyday law, and its prob-
lems and injustices are encoded in its tropes and images and words and argu-
ments, which is not altogether surprising because La Fontaine, the fabulist,
was also a lawyer.⁵⁴ But of course, none of this is clear on its face.We need guid-
ance to understand the fable in these terms, to read beyond abstract ideas of
power and sovereignty and injustice to find the localized harms of law that
have been lost from view. We fable La Fontaine’s barbs if we only read them
as an account of abstract power, and through a material reading of the fable,
through accounts of the operation of law and justice in seventeenth-century
France, that we find that La Fontaine has a much smaller target at stake than
 Carla Freccero, “A Race of Wolves” in Animots: Post Animality in French Thought:Yale French
Studies Number , eds. Matthew Senior, David L. Clark, and Carla Freccero (Yale: Yale Univer-
sity Press, ): –, –.
 Colloquially “without further ado”; “the term dates to the sixteenth-century, where death
sentences were legion, taking place after a show trial” [my translation] available at: http://
www.linternaute.com/expression/langue-francaise//sans-autre-forme-de-proces/century
(last access June , ).
 A number of references indicate he was legally trained. “Entre  et , Jean de La Fon-
taine est à Paris où il étudie le droit […] avec Maucroix et Antoine Furetière” – Between –
, Jean de La Fontaine was in Paris where he studied law with Maucroix and Antoine Fur-
etière [my translation]: Biographie de Jean de la Fontaine, available at: http://www.la-fontaine-
ch-thierry.net/biographie.htm (last access June , ),. An English version says in  “He is
back in Paris with his friends Maucroix and Furetière and has begun to study law. He becomes a
barrister in ,” available at: http://www.musee-jean-de-la-fontaine.fr/jean-de-la-fontaine-
page-uk- - -.html (last access June , ).
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we realize. And that property owners, and lawyers who support those property
owners, are the purveyors of profound, localized injustice – through manifesta-
tions of power.
David Parker describes the practices of law and justice in seventeenth-cen-
tury France in these terms: “It would be difficult to find a more ingenious legit-
imization of the civil and legal inequalities inherent in the structures of the
French state,”⁵⁵ than through the administration of law and justice, in particular
through its operation at a local level. If anything manifested “social and civil in-
equality through legal privilege, [it was] best reflected perhaps in the idea that
litigants ought to appear before their natural judges.”⁵⁶ A lamb ought to appear
before the wolf, her natural judge, just as a tenant would be judged by their land-
owner, their natural judge, and so on, up the chain, a claim to jurisdiction over
their dependents whether based in law or otherwise, that is through claims made
in power alone, and not law Parker turns to Jean Bacquet’s 1688 Traité des droits
de justice, haute, moyenne et basse,⁵⁷ along with other contemporary legal com-
mentators, to paint a picture of the forms of localized power claimed by land-
owners in the century leading up to the French Revolution. It revealed that in
the absence of formal legal bases for the invocation of jurisdictional claims by
landowners over tenants, fictitious devices designed to claim jurisdiction were
used as a matter of course. These were, in effect, actions outside law, and ranged
from simply claiming the power to “institute a judge, a procureur fiscal, a clerk
and sergeants,”⁵⁸ or by asserting that actions were “dominial,” such as imposing
fines without appeal for non-payment of dues,⁵⁹ as an exercise of power absent
law.
Even more striking is Parker’s observation that: “all [the contemporary] writ-
ers […] agree that justice was a patrimonial right and could be bought and
sold,”⁶⁰ and that despite the shift to a more centralized administration and ra-
tionalization of law during the seventeenth century, “the persistent perception
of the interdependence of rights of property and those of justice was not dimin-
ished by the continual alienation of royal rights in both.”⁶¹ Networks of privilege
 David Parker, “Sovereignty, Absolutism and the Function of the Law in Seventeenth-Century
France,” Past & Present for Thought  (): –, .
 Parker, “Law in Seventeenth-Century France,” , also .
 Treatise on the Laws of Justice, High, Middle and Low [my translation].
 Parker, “Law in Seventeenth-Century France,” .
 Parker, “Law in Seventeenth-Century France,” .
 Parker, “Law in Seventeenth-Century France,” .
 Parker, “Law in Seventeenth-Century France,” .
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and connection resulted in the manipulation of the judicial system,⁶² but in any
case:
The jurists and legal practitioners of the day were more interested in the distribution, ad-
ministration and execution of justice than in the enunciation of abstract principles about
its source; when they did focus on this question, their frame of reference was a divinely
ordained universe in which power, wealth and status were dispersed in hierarchical
fashion.⁶³
Knowing this, La Fontaine’s fable can never look the same again. It is not simply
or solely a disquisition on the operation of abstract ideals of justice levelled
against an absolutist monarch, but a criticism of the operation of law at a
local, material level. The lamb’s fate speaks to and is directed towards forms
and practices of localized injustice, the stuff of the everyday law under a judicial
system grounded in power and privilege. The wolf ’s actions are no different to
the kinds of behaviour of the landowners of seventeenth-century France,who as-
sumed precisely this kind of wrenching power over their tenants, the wolves met-
ing out injustice over their lambs.
The fable historicized reveals that whatever political concern animated
La Fontaine, he was also attacking everyday legal practices based in and attach-
ing to power that comes with property; his elegant alexandrines speaking to
forms of elegant modes of law absent justice and thus enacting the expectations
of the Logic, through the language of rationality and reason. In doing so, he was
thus speaking to his own propertied readers who were themselves the self-same
distributors of law without justice; we have to remember that fables were not
the stuff of children’s literature, but directed towards adults and their morality.
In speaking to those who held property in the ancien régime, we see the fable
directed towards something much more material and less abstract than we imag-
ine of La Fontaine’s barbs.
 Parker, “Law in Seventeenth-Century France,” .
 Parker, “Law in Seventeenth-Century France,” .
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3. “Thus the harmful one hurts the harmless,
and invents a reason for harming.”
La Fontaine was continuing a tradition. Another earlier fabulist (who was also
possibly a lawyer), the fifteenth-century Scottish poet Robert Henryson,⁶⁴ had
said more-or-less the same thing to property owners and lawyers in a highly bar-
bed gloss he appended to his version of the fable. He did not let the fable speak
on its own, adding in clear words the moral of the fable (perhaps not trusting the
fable to be interpreted by law’s interpreters), to make amply clear its message
and its target. He spoke plainly and directly to lawyers, courts and the proper-
tied, that is, to those who had the power to, and could, act against their
tenants,⁶⁵ whose actions amounted to those of nothing other than those of the
wolf against the lamb. Henryson chided them for pursuing those of unequal
means for the smallest of breaches, and who used law not to achieve justice,
but to extend and expand their wealth, using law to push their tenants out of
their dwellings and land.⁶⁶
Rather than making his point through the rationality of La Fontaine’s ele-
gant alexandrines, Henryson uses verse to ensure that his coda reiterates the
fable’s message. As Wang puts it: “Through deft handling of poetic style, Henry-
son achieves through pathos what might be impossible through logic alone: he
moves readers to pity society’s lambs, despise its wolves, and envision social
change […]”:⁶⁷
The poor folk, then, this Lamb may signify,
Like cottars, pedlars, and such labouring men;
Their life is half a purgatory aye,
Even with honest work, as we well ken.
The Wolf stands for extortioners, who then
Oppress such poor folk, as we often see,
By violence, or by guile and subtlety.
 ?-?: Wang, “Robert Henryson.” For the fables in their original middle Scots, avail-
able at: http://d.lib.rochester.edu/teams/text/kindrick-poems-of-robert-henryson-morall-fabillis
(last access June , ).
 MacQueen, John, SCROLL: Scottish Cultural Review of Language and Literature, Volume ,
Complete and Full with Numbers: The Narrative Poetry of Robert Henryson (Scroll ) (Amsterdam:
Editions Rodopi, ), –.
 MacQueen, Henryson, .
 Wang, “Robert Henryson,” .
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There are three Wolves which in this world now reign:
The first are those perverters of the Law,
Who, by their weasel words, their powers maintain,
And swear it’s nothing but the truth on show;
But, for a bribe, the poor they’ll overthrow,
Suppressing right, helping the wrong succeed;
Hell’s fire awaits all such when they are dead.
O man of law, abandon subtlety,
Your crafty words, your plots so intricate;
Remember God, in His divinity,
Sees through the falsehoods you use in debate.
For gear or gold, for high or rich estate,
For causes false, make you no more defence;
Let justice reign; obey your conscience.⁶⁸
We are left in no doubt about Henryson’s message. He tells us plainly.What is ob-
vious and clear in Henryson’s version of the fable, however, is lost to the twenti-
eth-first century reader in La Fontaine’s highly stylized fable. We interpolate ab-
straction and grand notions of power, losing sight of the local and particular
targets of injustice in his sights. For we engage in the “faire” savoir in reading
La Fontaine’s fable, projecting our assumptions about law into his text. This mat-
ters because La Fontaine’s fable seems to speak to contemporary legal concepts,
from rights of property to the language of contract and obligation,⁶⁹ but particu-
larly because of its heavy reliance on reason, rationality and logic. However,
these kinds of abstract principles were of little or no relevance to the lawyers of
seventeenth-century France, as Parker shows, meaning we read something into
the fable and the arguments of the anthropomorphized advocates, wolf and
lamb, that simply are not there if we understand is target to (only) be that of a
form of sovereignty and power. Reading La Fontaine’s fable without the everyday
of law which animates it means that we fable the fable, parlaying it into the twen-
ty-first century with only a partial awareness of the injustices it seeks to expose.
This kind of legal fabling, in which law and its interpreters are actively engag-
ed in the “faire” savoir confound law’s assumption of rationality and reason. To
fable in this way, it might be suggested, is a form of practice that might be excused
by time and across space. But later in this collection, I turn to a fabled case decid-
ed some 200 years later where all manner of legal fablings persist, on the other
side of the world and in a completely different legal system, in an unlikely twist.
 Translation of Middle Scots, available at: http://www.arts.gla.ac.uk/STELLA/STARN/poetry/
HENRYSON/fables/lamb.htm (last access June , ).
 Marin, Food for Thought, –.
46 Marett Leiboff
Brought to you by | University of Wollongong Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/21/16 2:49 AM
